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Abstract
This paper provides a systematic quantication of the short-run e¤ects of monetary policy
shocks under incomplete markets. Our framework of analysis is the benchmark exible-price
neoclassical growth model with innitely-lived and ex ante identical individuals, which we aug-
ment with i. uninsurable idiosyncratic labor income shocks; ii. a liquidity motive for holding real
money balances (via a money-in-the-utility specication); and iii. aggregate shocks to the rate
of money growth. We calibrate the model so as to match the historical ination process as well
as the broad features of the cross-sectional distributions of monetary and nonmonetary assets in
the US economy. Our main nding is that, even though market incompleteness has a moderate
impact on the response of aggregates to the shocks (relative to the complete-market case), this
results from composition e¤ects that mask a great deal of cross-household redistribution and
heterogeneities in individual portfolio adjustments.
JEL codes : E21; E32; E41
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we undertake a quantitative investigation of the short-run e¤ects of monetary shocks
for model economies with incomplete markets. Since the seminal work of Bewley (1980), Huggett
(1993) and Aiyagari (1994), the existence of uninsurable individual risks has been largely viewed
as crucial for understanding the patterns of consumption, savings and portfolio allocation of in-
dividuals. More recently, the incomplete markets literature has investigated the role of those
idiosyncractic risks for the aggregate economy by considering their interplay with macroeconomic
shocks. In particular, earlier work has quantied the importance of incomplete markets for the real
business cycles (Krusell and Smith, 1998), unemployment dynamics (Krusell et al., 2010), portfolio
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choices (Krusell and Smith, 1997), scal policies (Heathcothe, 2005; Challe and Ragot, 2011) and
the welfare e¤ect of real uctuations (Storesletten et al., 2001; Krebs, 2003; Krusell et al., 2009).
Thus far, the study of incomplete-market models has largely bypassed the analysis of the real
e¤ects of monetary policy shocks. This is all the more surprising that, rst, market incompleteness
is known to signicantly alter the e¤ect of monetary growth in the long-run steady state, due to
heterogeneities in asset and money holdings across households (Erosa and Ventura, 2002; Algan and
Ragot, 2010); and second, the presence of unsinsurable individual risks and borrowing constraints
gives room to potentially important redistributive e¤ects of monetary shocks in the short run,
which are well identied both empirically and theoretically. For example, Doepke and Schneider
(2006) show that there is a huge amount of heterogeneity in nominal asset positions among US
households, implying that a moderate ination episode would have large redistributive e¤ects.
From a theoretical point view, heterogeneities in asset holdings are naturally rationalized by the
inability of agents to perfectly insure against idiosyncratic shocks (e.g., to labour incomes, trading
opportunities, production possibilities, preferences, etc.). In this context, monetary shocks that
a¤ect either the cross-sectional distribution of nominal wealth or the price level or both redistribute
real wealth across households and have nonneutral e¤ects on allocations (see Scheinkman and Weiss,
1986; Berentsen et al., 2005; Algan et al., 2011.) While the emphasis on wealth redistribution as a
key source of short-run monetary nonneutrality can be traced back at least to Friedman (1968), it
has not yet made its way into quantitative business cycle analysis with heterogenous agents.
This paper lls this gap by providing a systematic quantication of the short-run e¤ects and
channels of monetary policy shocks under incomplete markets. The starting point of our analysis
is the benchmark neoclassical growth model with innitely-lived and ex ante identical individuals,
which we augment with i. uninsurable labor income risk a la Bewley-Hugget-Aiyagari; and ii. a
liquidity motive for holding real money balances, introduced via a money-in-the-utility function
specication (MIU). These features imply that households hold nonnegative quantities of both real
and nominal assets in equilibrium, which they use to partly self-insure against idiosyncratic income
changes in the face of incomplete consumption insurance. Finally, aggregate shocks to the growth
rate of the money supply a¤ect the courses of nominal prices and the ination rate, both of which
inuence the cross-sectional distribution of real money demands and the aggregate supply of real
balances. Since our focus is on how market incompleteness and wealth redistribution a¤ect the
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models response to monetary shocks relative to the full-insurance case, we entirely abstract from
other frictions, notably nominal rigidities.
Because our investigation is primarily quantitative, a prerequisite for a meaningful analysis of
the impact of monetary shocks is that the model reproduce a realistic cross-sectional distribution of
money holdings among the households in the rst place (in addition to reproducing a realistic cross-
sectional distribution of capital holdings). We show that this requirement necessitates departing
from the functional form commonly used to parameterize money demand in monetary models with
representative agent (e.g., Chari et al., 1996, 2000). As discussed extensively in Ragot (2011),
the empirical cross-sectional distribution of money holdings in the US is close to that of nancial
assets and very di¤erent from that of individual consumption levels. This property cannot follow
from the usual assumption that the elasticity of substitution between real money balances and
consumption is constant, because constant elasticity implies that money holdings are proportional
to consumption and hence inequalities in money holdings mirror inequalities in consumption. We
thus introduce a more general utility function that nests the constant-elasticity specication as a
special case, but also accommodates a non constant elasticity and hence allows changes in individual
consumption to be associated with more than proportional changes in real money holdings. This
function allows us to reproduce the broad features of the joint distribution of money holdings and
consumption in the US, whilst at the same time being consistent with the observation that, at
the individual level, higher wealth is associated with greater absolute money holdings but lower
money holdings relative to total wealth. Given the key role of our assumed utility function in this
study, we are careful to gauge its importance in the transmission of monetary shocks via systematic
comparison with the constant-elasticity case.
Our analysis allows us to disentangle three potentially important channels of monetary non-
neutrality under incomplete markets. First, a monetary shock is generically associated with an
immediate redistribution of wealth across individuals who have heterogenous marginal propensities
to consume out of wealth; in particular, if ination hurts cash-rich households to the benets of
cash-poor ones and the latter have higher marginal propensity to consume, then this instantaneous
redistributive e¤ect tends to raise current consumption.1
1This channel was originally identied by Scheinkman and Weiss (1986). Algan et al. (2011) construct a tractable
Bewley model that incorporates this channel, which they label the intratemporal ination tax(as opposed to the
intertemporal tax working through ination expectations.) Note that the impact of money growth shocks crucially
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The second e¤ect is an intertemporal redistributive e¤ect that is operative as soon as money
growth shocks are persistent. If, for example, a money growth shock is associated with a redistribu-
tion of wealth from the rich to the poor, then a persistent shock is associated with the anticipation
that this redistribution will prevail in the future, thereby deterring cash-rich households from hold-
ing real balances and urging them to buy both consumption goods and real assets (i.e., claims to
the capital stock) instead.
The third e¤ect is a portfolio composition e¤ect that comes from the presence of borrowing-
constrained households and their reaction to future ination, relative to that of unconstrained
households. Unconstrained households hold both claims to the capital stock and real money, and
always rebalance their portfolio towards the former and away from the latter when expected ination
rises and hence return from holding real money balances falls.2 In contrast, households facing a
binding borrowing constraint hold at least some money units (due to the complementarity between
money and consumption) but no claim to the capital stock, and so do not enjoy the same portfolio
rebalancing option. It follows that the overall impact of a persistent money growth shock is scaled
by the proportion of households facing a binding borrowing constraint in the economy.3
We measure the relative contributions of those three channels by comparing our benchmark
economys response to aggregate shocks to those produced by alternative economies wherein some
of these channels are made inoperative by construction. For example, imposing i.i.d. money
growth shocks (rather than suitably parameterized persistent shocks) allows us to hold expected
ination constant, thereby making the second and third channels inoperative and thus isolating
the intratemporal redistributive e¤ect of the shock (the rst channel.) Similarly, considering a
representative-agent economy allows us to isolate the e¤ect of expected ination on the demand for
real balances by unconstrained households; by di¤erence, this provides a measure of the role of con-
strained households in modifying the response to the shock (the third channel.) As discussed above,
we also systematically compare the responses of our economies with and without the assumption
depends on which agents receive the newly-issued money. Under lump-sum transfers, money growth shocks typically
redistribute real wealth from cash-rich rich, low-marginal propensity to consume households towards cash-poor, high
marginal propensity households, which goes towards raising aggregate consumption.
2See Cooley and Hansen (1989) for a detailed analysis of this intertemporal ination tax within a representative-
agent economy.
3The only tradeo¤ faced by constrained households is between holding cash and consuming. A rise in expected
ination may even lead them to demand more real balances if the intertemporal income e¤ect dominates the in-
tertemporal substitution e¤ect. See Algan and Ragot (2010) for a full discussion of this point.
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that the elasticity of substitution between consumption and real money holdings is constant.
Our general nding is that incorporating uninsurable individual risks into a monetary business
cycle model leads to quantitatively important departure from the complete-market set-up. First, a
positive, persistent money growth shock leads to a fall in consumption and an increase in saving and
investment in the complete-market economy. Moving from complete to incomplete markets with
a standard utility function (with constant elasticity of substitution between consumption and real
balances) divides roughly by two the real short-run e¤ect of the shock on aggregates, and also reverts
the long-run e¤ect. Second, moving from this simple utility function to one with non-constant
elasticity of substitution (so as to match the empirical distribution of money holdings) increases
by roughly 45% the short- and long-run impacts of persistent monetary shocks on aggregates, both
under complete and incomplete markets. As a result, moving from the complete-market economy
with simple utility function to our benchmark economy with incomplete markets and non-constant
elasticity of substitution lowers the short run impact of a positive, persistent money growth shocks
by 70%, and reverts the long-run impact of the shock.
Related literature. Our paper relates to a vast literature that evaluates the impact of mon-
etary growth on aggregates under heterogenous cash holdings. From a theoretical point of view,
our analysis follows Bewley (1980), Scheinkman and Weiss (1986), Kehoe et al. (1992), Imro-
horoglu (1992), Akyol (2004) and Algan and Ragot (2011). Those papers share with the present
contribution the emphasis on uninsurable labor market risk as potentially relevant for the trans-
mission of monetary policy. However, all these contributions except for Scheinkman and Weiss
(1986) focus on the impact of long-run ination on aggregates, while we are chiey interested in
the economys response to money growth shocks. Our framework also di¤ers substantially from
that in Scheinkman and Weiss (1986), who ignore capital accumulation or the role of persistent
aggregate shocks. The non-neutrality of ination working through wealth redistribution has also
been explored within search-theoretic models, in which households face idiosyncratic trading op-
portunities and need cash to facilitate future trades (Green and Zhou, 1999; Camera and Corbae,
1999; and Molico, 2006.) Erosa and Ventura (2002) as well as Albanesi (2006) also focus on the
e¤ect of long-run ination under heterogenous cash holdings.
Doepke and Schneider (2006b) quantify the redistributive e¤ect of monetary shocks on macro-
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economic aggregates by using an overlapping-generations model with exogenous heterogeneity
across ages and productivity (see also Heer and Maussner, 2011.) An important di¤erence with our
approach is that they exclude labor market risks, the key source of heterogeneity in asset holdings
in our economy. The redistributive channels through which monetary shocks a¤ect the economy
in Doepke and Schneider are linked to life-cycle e¤ects in saving behavior, while they are due to
precautionary saving in our setup.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and constructs its recursive
equilibrium. Section 3 calibrates the model. Section 4 presents our results, both at the steady state
and with aggregate uncertainty. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
The model is a version with aggregate shocks of the framework originally developed by Algan and
Ragot (2010). While their work is concerned with the e¤ect of long-run mean ination on capital
accumulation and macroeconomic aggregates, the present paper focuses on how the redistributive
e¤ects of ination shocks a¤ect those variables in the short run. The key di¤erence with the
framework of Aiyagari (1994) and Krusell and Smith (1998) is that real money balances enter
householdsutility function, so that households hold both money and claims to the capital stock
in equilibrium.
2.1 Preferences
Households are innitely-lived and in constant mass equal to 1. They share identical and additively
time-separable preferences over sequences of consumption, c  fctg1t=0, and real money holdings,
m  fmtg1t=0. Thus, they maximize
U (c;m) = E0
1X
t=0
tu (ct;mt) ; (1)
where  2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount factor, Et denotes expectations conditional on the
information set at date t, and u is the instant utility function. As discussed above, matching a
realistic joint cross-sectional distribution of consumption, real balances and claims to the capital
stocks requires considering a parametric instant utility function that is more general than that
6
commonly used in the MIU literature. More specically, we assume that
u (ct;mt) =
1
1  

!c1 t + (1  !)m(1 )t
 1 
1 
:; ;  > 0: (2)
When  = 1, (2) becomes a standard homothetic utility function such as that used by Chari
et al. (1996, 2000) and Algan and Ragot (2010), among others. In this case, the interest-rate
elasticity of real money demand is 1=, while the intertemporal elasticity of substitution between
consumption and real balances is (1 )=( ): However, a important limitation of the homothethic
specication is that it implies a strict proportionality between individual real money holdings and
individual consumption levels (for any given values of the nominal interest rate and the ination
rate), making it impossible to reproduce the highly unequal distribution of money holdings that is
observed in US data. Our benchmark economy will thus have  6= 1.
2.2 Idiosyncratic Uncertainty
In every period, households are subject to idiosyncratic labor income shocks. Labor productivity
can take three di¤erent values et 2 E, E = fel; em; ehg with el < em < eh and where eh stands for
high productivity, em for medium productivity, and el for low productivity. Each households
productivity evolves according to a rst-order Markov chain with the 3  3 transition matrix .
We denote by p the vector of stationary ergodic probabilities and normalize productivity levels so
that the mean of the invariant distribution is one, i.e.,
P
pi ei = 1. Given a population of measure
one, we can interpret p as describing the distribution of the population across productivity states.
It follows that the e¤ective aggregate labor supply is equal to
P
pi ein = n, where n stands for
labour hours per period.
2.3 Production Technology
Markets are competitive. In every period t, the representative rm uses aggregate capital Kt 2 R+
and householdslabor to produce Yt 2 R+ units of a single good with the aggregate technology
Yt = f(Kt; n) = K

t n
1 :
Capital depreciates at the constant rate  2 (0; 1) and accumulates according to the law of
motion
Kt+1 = It + (1  )Kt: (3)
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where It denotes aggregate investment. Perfect competition in the markets for the representative
rms inputs implies that the real interest rate, rt, and the real wage, wt, are given by:
rt = K
 1
t n
1    ; wt = (1  )Kt n :
2.4 Monetary policy
At each date t, the government chooses the growth rate of the money stock, t. Let us denote by
t the quantity of newly issued money at date t (relative to the stock of nominal money at the end
of date t  1), by 
t the aggregate supply of real balances at date t, and by t = Pt=Pt 1 = 1+ t
the gross ination rate between date t   1 and date t. In real term, the quantity of newly issued
money can be written as:
t=Pt = tPt 1
t 1=Pt = t
t 1=t: (4)
On the other hand, the dynamics of real money balances is given by:

t = (1 + t)

t 1
t
: (5)
There are several possible ways to model money creation in heterogeneous-agent economies. It
could for example result from open market operations, which in their simplest form would amount
to giving the newly-issued money to the government. Alternatively, the newly-issued pieces of
currency could be targeted towards specic households, which would by construction generate
sizeable redistributive e¤ects. In what follows, it is assumed that the new money is distributed
equally to every household in a lump-sum manner. This choice is the most natural from a theoretical
point of view, as any deviation from that benchmark can be thought as a scal transfer across
households. Moreover, there is no clear empirical evidence that money creation is targeted towards
specic households.
2.5 The householdsproblem
We assume that markets are incomplete, so that households cannot write insurance contracts
contingent on their labor income. Moreover, they face borrowing constraints and are thus prevented
from using private loans to fully smooth out individual income uctuations. Each household i
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maximizes its expected lifetime utility (1) subject to the following constraints:
cit + k
i
t+1 +m
i
t = a
i
t + wte
i
tn+ t

t 1
t
; (6)
kit+1  0; mit  0, and cit  0; (7)
where kit+1 and m
i
t denote the claims to the capital stock and the real money balances held by
household i at the end of date t, and where
ait = (1 + rt) k
i
t +
mit 1
1 + t
is the households nancial wealth at the beginning of date t. In (7), the presence of the borrowing
constraint is reected in the fact that capital and money holdings must be nonnegative at all times,
while no other assets (i.e., private bonds) can be issued by the households.
From the householdsobjective and constraints, we nd that their optimal asset demands, mit
and kit+1, must satisfy the following rst order conditions:
 Money:
uc
 
cit;m
i
t
  um  cit;mit = Et
"
uc
 
cit+1;m
i
t+1

1 + t+1
#
: (8)
 Capital:
Either uc
 
cit;m
i
t

= Et

(1 + rt+1)uc
 
cit+1;m
i
t+1

and kit+1 > 0; (9)
or uc
 
cit;m
i
t

> Et

(1 + rt+1)uc
 
cit+1;m
i
t+1

and kit+1 = 0:
The instant utility function (2) implies that um
 
cit; 0

= 1, so the demand for real balances
is always interior. In contrast, the demand for capital may be corner (i.e., kit+1 = 0), in which
case the household would like to raise current consumption by borrowing against future income,
but is prevented from doing so by a (binding) borrowing constraint.The solution to the households
problem provides sequences of functions mt (a; e), kt (a; e) and ct (a; e), (a; e) 2 R+  fe1; e2; e3g,
where a and e denote individual beginning-of-period asset wealth and productivity, respectively.
To better understand the implications of our assumed period utility function with non-constant
elasticity of substitution (i.e., (2)), consider the optimal trade-o¤ between consumption and real
money holdings by an unconstrained household (so that kit+1 > 0 in (9)) and abstract from aggregate
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shocks momentarily. From (8)(9), we nd the relation between money holdings and consumption
to be:
mit = A (rt+1; t+1)
 
cit
 
1 (1 ) ; (10)
where A (rt+1; t+1) is a coe¢ cient whose value depends on the returns on the two assets and
the deep parameters of the utility function. In the constant-elasticity case (i.e.,  = 1), we have
mit = A (rt+1; t+1) c
i
t, that is, real money demand is strictly proportional to consumption, so
that cross-sectional inequalities in these two variables mirror each other. For individual money
holdings to increase more than proportionally following an increase in individual consumption, so
that money be more unequally distributed than consumption (as is observed in the data), one needs
= (1   (1  )) > 1 (whether  must lie above or below 1 for this inequality to hold depends on
the value of .)
2.6 Market Equilibria
Dene t : R+

eh; em; el
	! R+ as the joint cross-sectional distribution of wealth and individual
productivity at the beginning of period t. The market-clearing conditions in the money and capital
markets are given by: Z Z
mit(at; et)d (at; et) = 
t; (11)Z Z
kt(at; et)d (at; et) = Kt+1: (12)
By Walras law, the goods market clear when both the money and the capital markets clear.
It is worth noting at this stage that introducing money and a market-clearing condition of
the form of (11) raises specic computational di¢ culties, relative to conventional market-clearing
conditions in heterogenous-agent models. More specically, households must base their optimal
consumption plans on their beginning-of-period asset wealth. In models with capital and/or public
debt only, the beginning-of-period cross-sectional distribution of wealth is entirely determined by
portfolio decisions made in the previous period. In monetary models like ours, a key component
of beginning-of-period asset wealth is real money, whose value is a¤ected by nominal prices that
are determined in the current period (see (5), where current ination, and hence current nominal
prices, determine the supply of real balances in the current period.) Hence, the value of the price
level that clears the money market at any given date must be solved jointly with the households
optimal portfolio decisions about capital and real money balances.
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2.7 Denition of the recursive equilibrium
Since we are considering a recursive equilibrium in which the aggregate state changes over time, we
must include in the individual value functions both the aggregate stock of capital and the aggregate
stock of real money. Hence, given prices, the recursive problem of an individual household can be
written as:
v (at; et; t;Mt 1;Kt) = max
mt;ct;kt+1
u (ct;mt) + Et

v
 
at+1; et+1; t+1;Mt;Kt+1
 jet; t ; (13)
subject to (6)(7). Following Krusell and Smith (1998) and much of the subsequent literature, we
posit that households are able to successfully forecast the dynamics of the aggregate state by means
of (log-) linear laws of motion involving only the rst moments of the distributions of the relevant
endogenous state variables. That is, these laws of motion approximately follow
ln (Mt) = a1() + a2() ln (Kt) + a3() ln (Mt 1) ; (14)
ln (Kt+1) = b1() + b2() ln (Kt) + b3() ln (Mt 1) : (15)
The solution to (13) produces individual decision rules for consumption as well as holdings of real
balances and claims to the capital stock, which we denote by gc(at; et; t;Mt 1;Kt); gm(at; et; t;Mt 1;Kt)
and gk(at; et; t;Mt 1;Kt); respectively. The law of motion of the distribution of beginning-of pe-
riod real wealth is denoted by H. For a given set of individual policy rules, this law of motion can
be written as
t+1 = H(t; t; t+1):
As usual, the cross-sectional distribution of wealth at date t+1 depends on the same distribution
at date t and on the date t aggregate shock, t. As explained above, it also depends on the price
level at date t+ 1 and thus on the realized value of the money growth shock, t+1.
Denition of the recursive equilibrium. The recursive equilibrium of this economy is dened
by a law of motion H of the joint distribution , a set of optimal individual policies and value
functions fgc; gm; gk; vg, a set of pricing functions f; r; wg, and a set of law of motions for K and
M such that:
1. Given f; r; wg, the exogenous transition matrices for the exogenous shocks e and , the law
of motions for K and M , fgc; gm; gkg solve the households problem;
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2. The money and capital markets clear;
3. The law of motion H(t; t; t+1) is generated by the optimal decisions fgc; gm; gkg, the law
of motions for K and M and the transition matrices for the shocks.
2.8 Numerical solution
As mentionned above, we use the same approach as in Krusell and Smith (1997, 1998), who
summarize the cross-sectional distribution of wealth with a nite set of moments and approximate
the transition for the aggregate laws of motion using a simulation procedure. However, rather than
using Monte Carlo simulations to generate an updated cross-sectional distribution, we use the grid-
based simulation procedure proposed by Young (2010), which keeps track of the mass of households
at a ne grid of wealth levels. This allows us to get rid of the cross-sectional sampling variations in
the Monte Carlo simulation procedure. However, the grid-based procedure slightly complicates the
numerical solution to our model. Indeed, the updating of the wealth distribution should now take
account of the fact that the wealth distribution at the beginning of the current period not only
depends on past decisions but also on the current ination rate. So, for a given arbitrary ination
rate , we determine the individual policy functions gm(:;) and gk(:;) as in Krusell and Smith
(1997) and the wealth distribution  (a; e; ), given last periods wealth distribution 
 
a; e; t 1

and policy functions gm(:;t 1) and gk(:;t 1), where t 1 stands for last periods equilibrium
ination rate. It is then possible to nd the value of  that clears the money market. A more
detailed description of the algorithm is provided in the Appendix.
Before presenting the results, it is important to assess the accuracy of the aggregate laws of
motion. We did so by calculating the maximum absolute forecast error ten period ahead, that is,
the di¤erence between the predicted values of K andM using the aggregate laws of motion and the
supposed truevalues that come out of the simulation using individual policy functions. Every ten
periods, we update the values of K and M with the corresponding supposed true values, since we
are mostly interested in the short-run e¤ects of aggregate shocks. Using a 10,000-period simulation,
we found for the benchmark model that the maximum cumulative absolute forecasting errors are
0.28% for M and 0.82% for K.4 The accuracy is thus satisfactory.
4The average errors are 0.018% and 0.052% for M and K, respectively.
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3 Parametrization
3.1 Description of the economies
Our benchmark economy is one with i. persistent money growth shocks, as summarized by a (2-
state) Markov chain parameterized to match the historical evidence on the persistence of ination;
and ii. a instant utility function featuring non-constant elasticity of substitution between real
balances and consumption, which will help us match the empirical cross-sectional distribution of
money holdings. In order to precisely identify and disentangle the various channels of monetary
nonneutrality at work in our model and the way they interact, we compare our benchmark economy
with suitably chosen alternatives.
First, we systematically compare our model with non-constant elasticity of substitution be-
tween money and consumption to the more common constant-elasticity specication. For ease
of exposition, in the remainder of the paper we shall simply refer to the former and the latter
as the "elaborate" and "simple" utility functions, respectively. This comparison will allow us to
assess how the matching of a realistic distribution of money holdings matters for the predicted
impact of aggregate money growth shocks. Second, we shall compare our benchmark model with
the complete-market model, where the self-insurance motive for holding assets is shut down. This
will allow us to precisely measure the specic contribution of the redistribution of wealth to the
overall impact of a monetary shock, as opposed to the direct portfolio e¤ect based on changes in the
expected return on holding cash. Third, we work out the aggregate implications of our model when
money growth shocks are i.i.d. This economy will produce i.i.d. ination rates and hence constant
expected ination. Consequently, the nonneutrality of money coming from changes in expected
ination is shut down, so that the e¤ects of the shock have to come from the contemporaneous
redistribution of wealth.
3.2 Parameter values
Deep parameters common to all model specications. Table 1 presents the parameters
that are common to all economies under investigation. The time period is a quarter. Following
Chari et al. (2000), our benchmark value for the utility parameter  is 1. The capital share
is set to  = 0:36; and the depreciation rate to 0:025. Finally, labor supply is constant for all
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Table 1: Parameter values and simulation targets common across economies
Parameter set outside the model
Preferences  1.00 Production  0.360
 0.025
n 0.300
Productivity el 3.940
em 0.849
eh 0.213
l;l 0.975
m;m 0.992
households and set to 0:3.5 The individual productivity states and the transition probabilities
across states are calibrated as follows. Following Domjei and Heathcote (2004), we use a Markov
chain with three states, zero probabilities to transit between extreme states (i.e., h;l = l;h = 0),
and an equal probability to reach any of the extreme states when in the intermediate state (i.e.,
m;h = m;l). The transition matrix is then fully identied once l;l; m;m and h;h are set, and we
set l;l = h;h = 0:9750; m;m = 0:9925. Finally, the ratios of productivity are set to eh=em = 4:64
and em=el = 3:99. This process yields an autocorrelation of the real wage equal to 0.91 and a
standard deviation of the innovation term equal to 0.22 at annual frequency, in line with the data.
Deep parameters that vary across model specications. Table 2 gathers the parameters
that will vary across model specications so as to always match the same steady state targets as
in the baseline case. Our key targets are i. the Gini of the money distribution, ii. the money
to GDP ratio, iii. the interest rate elasticity of money, and iv. the capital-output ratio. The
monetary aggregate that we consider is M2, which best corresponds to the notion of liquid assets
in the Survey of Consumer Finances. Note that the Gini coe¢ cient of this distribution is as high
as 0.85. The quarterly value of M2 over GDP is 0:52 for the period 1982-2005. Estimates of the
interest elasticity of money demand applied to the M2 aggregate vary from 0:11 to 1, depending
on the estimation method being used and the period of estimation (see, e.g., Ireland, 2001, and
Holman, 1998). We target the relatively low value of 0:2; which is close to its post-Volcker empirical
counterpart. Finally, we target a capital-output ratio of 12 at quarterly frequency (see, e.g., Cooley,
1995.)
Table 2 provides the preference parameters that best match those targets for the four economies
5 It is straightforward to introduce elastic labor supply using GHH preferences, as in Heathcote (2005).
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Table 2: Parameter values varying across economies
Economy
Simple utility Elaborate utility
Complete-market
economy
Incomplete-market
economy
Complete-market
economy
Incomplete-market
economy
Preferences
 0.9943 0.99 0.9943 0.99
 5.00 5.00 15.00 15.00
! 0.24 0.24 0.017 0.48
 1 1 0.2857 0.2857
under consideration. Since the simple utility function cannot match the distribution of money
holdings, the preference parameters in this case are set to match the other targets only. In the case
of the elaborate utility function, we also aim at being as close as possible to the empirical Gini of
the money distribution.
Monetary policy parameters. Wemodel the dynamics of monetary conditions between 1982Q1
and 2005Q4 as a two-state, rst-order Markov chain. More specically, we estimate this chain using
CPI-ination and extract the ination levels that prevail in the high-versus low-inationregimes,
as well as the probabilities to transit between those regimes. We then use the two ination rates
to parameterize money growth our exogenous aggregate statein each regime. There are at least
two alternative ways of estimating the dynamics of monetary conditions. One would be to directly
estimate a Markov chain for the money supply. However, doing so would have led us to miss the
average ination rate that prevailed over the period due to substantial low-frequency movements in
the velocity of money. Since the ination rate is an important determinant of money demand and
the transmission of monetary shocks in our model, it is crucial that the latter produces an average
ination rate that is consistent with the data. Another way to proceed would have been to treat
the estimated ination rates in both regimes as exogenous forcing variables in our model and to
let the money supply adjust to exactly produce such rates in equilibrium; however, doing so would
make ination exogenous, whereas we are also interested in the endogenous response of ination to
monetary shocks under incomplete markets. Our approach, which consists of imposing the money
growth rates that correspond exactly to the ination rates of each regime, can be seen as striking
15
a balance between these two alternatives.
The parameters of the stochastic process for the money growth rate are shown in Table 3,
with the estimated transition probabilities corresponding to the autocorrelated case. As explained
above, we also experiment the impact of i.i.d. money growth shocks in our model economy; even
though not directly relevant empirically, the i.i.d. experiment is instructive as it maintains the
contemporaneous wealth redistribution induced by money growth shocks whilst eliminating changes
in expected money growth the only source of nonneutrality in exible-price, complete-markets
economies (Walsh, 2010, chapter 2.)
Table 3: Parameters of the stochastic process of the money supply for various economies
Money growth rate
1 = 0:64% 2 = 1:17%
Transition probabilities
IID Autocorrelated
1;1 = 0:5 1;1 = 0:944
1;1 = 0:5 2;2 = 0:889
4 Results
4.1 Equilibrium distribution and laws of motion
Before studying the impact of money growth shocks in our economy, we check that the latter
reproduces the broad features of the US wealth distribution. Unlike earlier studies, we seek to
match the distributions of two components of total wealth: money wealth and nonmonetary wealth.
Given our focus on portfolio allocations by the households, our empirical counterparts from the
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF 2004) are the following. First, we use the "liquid assets"
component of nancial wealth as a measure of householdsmoney wealth (as argued above, this
roughly corresponds to the assets belonging to the M2 monetary aggregate). Liquid assets in the
SCF are essentially made of money market accounts, checking accounts, saving accounts and call
accounts. Second, we compute the distribution of nonmonetary wealth by removing liquid assets
from the nancial assets held by the households in the SCF. From the SCF, nonmonetary wealth
refers to bonds, stocks, life insurance, retirement plans and other managed nancial assets. Table
16
4 compares the properties of those two distributions with those generated by the model, under the
parameter conguration specied in Tables 1-3.
Given our parametric utility function, all households hold some money in our model, even though
the amount being held may be very small. However, many households are not wealthy enough to
hold both money and nonmonetary assets: they are constrained, in the sense of endogenously
choosing not to hold capital not in the sense of holding zero wealth.
The benchmark model predicts a fairly high Gini index for the distribution of nonmonetary
assets (0.76), only slightly underestimating its empirical counterpart (0.82.) Moreover, the model
does a fairly good job at matching the lower tail of the distribution of nonmonetary assets. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, the model underestimates the nonmonetary wealth share of the top 1%, which
is predicted to be 8.99% while it is 34.30% in the data. This aw is common to many models
that only use idiosyncratic income risk to generate wealth dispersion and ignore, for example,
entrepreneurship (see, e.g., Quadrini, 2000.)
The empirical measure of the share of households facing a binding borrowing constraint heavily
depends on which indicator is chosen. Using information on the number of borrowing requests
which were rejected in the SCF, Jappelli argued that up to 19% of families are liquidity-constrained.
However, using updated SCF data, Budria Rodriguez et al. (2002) reported that only 2.5% of the
households have zero wealth, which might better correspond to our theoretical borrowing limit.
Obviously, this gure does not mean that only these households are liquidity-constrained. In
particular, Budria Rodriguez et al. (2002) also report that 6% of households have delayed their
debt repayments for two months or more, which could be used as another proxy for liquidity
constraints. In this respect, that our elaborate utility implies that 8% of the households face a
binding borrowing constraint can be considered as reasonable value, and notably one that prevents
us from over-estimating the e¤ect of the constraint on the non-neutrality of ination.
Appendix B shows the aggregate laws of motion for money and capital. As in Krusell and
and Smith (1998), we nd the rst-order moments of the distributions to yield an almost perfect
prediction of prices (based on the R-square statistics.)
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Table 4: Wealth distribution
Economy
Data Simple utility Elaborate utility
Distribution of nonmonetary assets
Gini 0.82 0.77 0.76
Share of constrained households [2%, 20%] 0.42 0.08
Fraction of total asset held by
Bottom 20% 0.00 0.00 0.01
Bottom 40% 0.20 0.00 0.05
Top 20% 84.70 80.60 79.27
Top 10% 71.20 55.02 53.61
Top 1% 34.30 9.32 8.99
Distribution of money holdings
Gini 0.85 0.31 0.72
Fraction of total money held by
Bottom 20% 0.00 15.61 0.72
Bottom 40% 0.00 26.92 2.81
Top 20% 88.20 41.52 78.19
Top 10% 76.46 24.72 56.93
Top 1% 39.49 3.37 11.44
Capital/GDP 12.00 11.71 11.86
Money/GDP 0.52 0.52 0.52
 The model properties are averages over a 10,000 period simulation.
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4.2 I.I.D. money growth shocks
We rst investigate the e¤ect of monetary shocks under incomplete markets under the assump-
tion that money growth shocks are i.i.d. (and denote the corresponding transition matrix across
aggregate states as T IID:) This is the most natural process to start with since, as argued above,
monetary shocks have no e¤ect on aggregates when shocks are i.i.d. and markets are complete.
Hence, while not realistic, i.i.d. shocks are interesting theoretically as they allow us to isolate a
transmission channel that is purely related to market incompleteness and borrowing constraints.
4.2.1 Individual Policy Rules
Figure 1 displays the individual policy rules when the money growth rate is 1 (the policy rules
when  = 2 are very similar) and for the average levels of capital K and money M . The policy
rules for total wealth, nonmonetary assets, money and consumption are decomposed for each level
of productivity eh, em and el. For example, the third panel of Figure 1 reports the individual
policy rules for nonmonetary assets. The policy rule lies above the 45-degree line for the most
productive household (with productivity eh) and below the 45-degree line for the other two types
(with productivity em or el). This implies that the former accumulate nonmonetary assets for self-
insurance purposes whereas the latter dis-save to smooth individual consumption. For medium- and
low-productivity households, the policy rule displays a kink at low levels of wealth; this is because at
such wealth levels these households choose to hold money but no nonmonetary assets. The second
and fourth panels show the policy rules for money holdings and consumption, which roughly display
the same pattern as the policy rule for nonmonetary assets. The more productive the household
(holding wealth constant), or the wealthier the household (holding productivity constant), the
higher are individual consumption and money holdings. The close connection between the policy
rules for consumption and money holdings stems from the complementarity between the two, a
direct implication of our assumed instant utility function.
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4.2.2 Aggregate Results
To disentangle the e¤ects of a positive money growth shock in this setting, we perform the following
experiment.6 We rst solve the stochastic model under i.i.d money growth shocks; the implied laws
of motion of the wealth distribution are given in Appendix B. We then hold monetary growth
at its low value 1 = 0:64% for a long period of time (T = 600): Aggregate consumption, real
money balances and the capital stock converge toward C0; M0 and K0, respectively, the value of
which are used as initial conditions for our experiment. At date 1, the economy is hit by a positive
money growth shock, with money growth jumping from 1 to 2 = 1:17%. At the time of the shock,
aggregate consumption and real money balances are changed to C1 and M1, respectively, while the
capital stock (which is predetermined) changes toK1 one period later. Our measures of of the short-
run e¤ects of the policy shock are simply the instant proportional changes in the relevant aggregates,
i.e., C1  (C1   C0) =C0, M1  (M1  M0) =M0 and K1  (K1  K0) =K0: To measure the
long-run impact of the shock, we hold monetary growth at  = 2 for a long period of time until
the economy converges to the new long-run values of consumption, money and capital holdings,
denoted by C1; M1 and K1, respectively. The long-run e¤ects of the shock are then given by
C1 = (C1   C0) =C0, M1 = (M1  M0) =M0 and K1 = (K1  K0) =K0. Although the
probability that this particular history of aggregate states will occur is low, this experiment is
natural as it allows to precisely identify the short- and long-run impact of a money growth shock
on aggregates. Table 5 shows the results for both the elaborate and the simple utility function.
Tables 6 and 7 decompose the responses to monetary shock by productivity types and wealth levels,
again under both specications of householdsinstant utility function.
The rst row of Table 5 shows the short- and long-run impact of a money growth shock for
our benchmark economy, in which households preferences are characterized by the elaborate utility
function and under the assumption that the budget of the government is balanced (that is, money
creation is not used to nance government spendings.) On impact, aggregate consumption rises by
0:15% and real money balances fall by 0:06%; after one period, the capital stock falls by a small
amount, 0:009%. These aggregate changes are best understood by looking at their decomposition
across wealth levels and productivity types, as is reported in Table 6. More specically, by looking
at the two ends of the wealth distribution (bottom and top 10%), we see that the aggregate e¤ects of
6The impact of a negative money growth shock is roughly the mirror image of that of a positive shock.
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the shock result from the composition of the reaction of the poor and the rich to the redistribution
of wealth caused by the shock. Under lump-sum money injections, the intratemporal ination
tax redistributes real wealth from wealthy households, whose money holdings are relatively high,
towards poorer households, whose money holdings are initially low. Since poor households have
a comparatively larger marginal propensity to consume out of wealth, this redistribution raises
aggregate consumption at the time of the shock. This e¤ect also shows up in the average change
in consumption by productivity type. The less productive households enjoy a consumption boom
on average, while the more productive ones cut down their consumption. This reects the fact
that low-productivity households are more numerous amongst wealth-poor households, while high-
productivity households are over-represented amongst the wealth-rich.
At the individual level, changes in real money holdings track changes in consumption, a reection
of the complementarity between those two inputs of the utility function. However, the consumption
fall for wealthy households is associated with a proportionally larger drop in their real money
demand, relative to the rise in money holdings experienced by poor households. The composition
of these two e¤ects leads to a mild fall in aggregate real money balances overall. Note that this
negative net e¤ect is a direct implication of our utility function with nonconstant elasticity of
substitution, which implies that a fall in consumption by rich households is associated with a
relatively large fall in their real money holdings, while a rise in consumption by poorer households
entails a more moderate rise in their real money holdings.
The short-run e¤ects of the money growth shock are reverted in the long-run (again, a hypo-
thetical situation wherein households experience a long spell of high money growth while having
expected the latter to be i.i.d.). In particular, aggregate consumption, money holdings and capital
all eventually fall. In the long run, the evolution of those variables is governed by the negative
wealth e¤ects incurred by wealthy households in every period. This leads to a fall in their holdings
of both monetary assets and claims to the capital stock and, ultimately, to a drop in aggregate
output and consumption.
The second row of Table 5 shows the results when the transfers from the government towards
private households do not depend on the money shock. In this case, the budget of the government
is not balanced as before, and we simply assume that the government spends its extra resources
on public consumption. This case isolates the specic redistributive e¤ects of the ination tax
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since the amount of wealth redistribution is not a¤ected by real money growth. In this situation,
the increase in monetized government spendings that follows from a positive money growth shock
induces substantial negative wealth e¤ects. As a consequence, all aggregates fall both in the short-
and the long-run.
The third and fourth rows of Table 5 show the results in the case of the simple instant utility
function (e.g. with constant elasticity of substitution between consumption and real money hold-
ings). As already discussed, this economy displays less inequalities in money holdings than under
the elaborate utility function. Consequently, a money growth shock has less redistributive e¤ects
under the balanced-budget rule, and the impact on aggregate consumption is milder. The utility
function also overturns the impact of the shock on total real money balances. Under the simple
utility function money demand is roughly proportional to consumption for all individuals, so an
increase in consumption directly translates into an increase in real money demand.
To summarize, the wealth heterogeneity that results from the presence of uninsurable labor
income risk implies that money growth shocks have real e¤ect even when expected money growth
is held constant (by the i.i.d. assumption.) Moreover, the size of those e¤ects depend on the extent
of the ination tax (balance-budget vs. constant transfer scal rule) as well as the cross-sectional
distribution of money holdings (which is indexed by the degree of complementarity between money
holdings and consumption.)
4.3 Persistent money growth shocks
We now consider the case where the rate of money growth is autocorrelated and given by the
transition matrix TAR. Unlike in the i.i.d. case, under persistent shocks an increase in the rate
of money growth changes households expected ination (e.g., a jump from low to high money
growth raises expected ination), which alters individual portfolio decisions and hence equilibrium
aggregates. To quantify the e¤ects of persistent money growth shocks, we perform an experiment
similar to that in the previous section; namely, money growth is held at the low rate 1 until
the economy converges to a low-ination equilibrium; the economy then switches to the high rate
2 and stays there for a long period of time. All along, households form expectations according
to the transition matrix TAR. The short-run e¤ects of the shock are measured by the immediate
proportional adjustments of the relevant aggregates, and the long-run e¤ects by the value that these
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Table 5: Responses to Monetary shocks: IID Shocks (in percent)
Short run e¤ect Long run e¤ect
C1 M1 K1 C1 M1 K1
Elaborate utility function
1.
Balanced
government budget
0.150 -0.058 -0.009 -0.115 -3.927 -1.247
2. Constant transfers -0.054 -0.122 -0.085 -1.676 -4.802 -3.503
Simple utility function
3.
Balanced
government budget
0.034 0.026 -0.002 -0.049 -0.102 -0.513
4. Constant transfers -0.093 -0.085 -0.085 -1.661 -1.557 -2.095
Note: Short run and long run e¤ects are calculated when the economy switches from of a stationary equilibrium
economy for 1 = 0:64% to an economy hits by a high value of monetary shock 2 = 1:17%. We calculate the changes
in the aggregate X in the short run as X1 X0
X0
and in the long run X1 X0
X0
, where X0 is the stationary equilibrium
value when  = 1, X1 is the new value just after the shock, and X1 is the long run stationary equilibrium value
when  = 2.
aggregates eventually take once the economy has eventually settled in the high-ination regime.
Table 8 summarizes the impact of a persistent money growth shock under complete and incomplete
markets, for both the elaborate and the simple utility functions.
The rst row of Table 8 shows the e¤ect of an increase in the rate of money growth in the
complete-market economy when preferences are given by the elaborate utility function. On impact,
consumption falls by 0:33% and aggregate money demand by 2%, while the capital stock increases
by 0:02% (after one period.) The reason is as follows: after a jump from low to high money
growth, households expect this higher growth to persist and hence future ination to be higher
on average. This leads them to lower their money holdings, and also their consumption due to
the complementarity between the two. The overall e¤ect of the shock is a portfolio shift towards
nonmonetary assets (i.e., the capital stock), with the aim of raising future consumption (a version of
the Tobin e¤ectof ination on portfolio choice.) In the long run, the higher capital accumulation
that prevails in the high money growth regime translates into higher aggregate consumption and
lower real money balances.
The second row of Table 8 shows the impact of a positive money growth shock in the incomplete-
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markets case. On impact, consumption falls by 0:07% and total money demand by 2:44%, while the
capital stock increases slightly. The e¤ects on consumption and capital are much weaker than under
complete markets. The milder fall in consumption stems from the redistributive e¤ect of the shock,
which goes towards raising aggregate consumption (just as in the i.i.d. case). In the long run, the
switch from low to high money growth under incomplete markets leads to a reduction in aggregate
consumption, money demand and the capital stock. These long-run e¤ects have been identied
and discussed in Algan and Ragot (2010); essentially, under incomplete markets the redistributive
e¤ect of ination deters self-insurance, since ination is a real transfer from the money-rich to the
money-poor.
The third and fourth rows of Table 8 show the impact of the money growth shock when prefer-
ences are characterized by the simple utility function. In the complete-markets case, the short-run
e¤ects of the shock on aggregates are qualitatively similar than under the elaborate utility function,
but about a third lower in magnitude; this is due to the di¤erence in the complementarity between
consumption and real balances across the two economies. In the incomplete-market case, consump-
tion and real balances fall on impact by 0:12 and 1:78%, respectively, while the capital stock rises
by a very small amount. The long-run e¤ects are again qualitatively similar, but quantitatively
smaller in magnitude, essentially because the simple utility function generates less inequalities in
money holdings and hence a milder redistributive e¤ect of the shock.
To summarize, under the elaborate utility function, incomplete markets and borrowing con-
straints divide by two the short-run e¤ects of a persistent money growth shock on aggregates, and
lead to a reversion of its long-run e¤ects (relative to the complete-markets case.) On the other
hand, moving from the simple to the elaborate utility function raises the impact of a persistent
money growth shock by roughly 45%. As a result, moving from the complete-market economy
with simple utility function (the basic representative-agent monetary model) to the economy with
incomplete markets and elaborate utility function (our benchmark model) leads to a reduction in
the real short-run e¤ects of a persistent money growth shocks of about 70%. Table 9 decomposes
the individual responses of consumption, money holdings and capital holdings to the shock by
productivity types and wealth levels under the simple and the elaborate utility functions.
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Table 8: Responses to Monetary shocks: Auto correlated shocks (in percent)
Short run e¤ect Long run e¤ect
C1 M1 K1 C1 M1 K1
Elaborate utility function
1. Complete markets -0.334 -2.007 0.020 0.076 -0.958 0.800
2. Incomplete markets -0.066 -2.440 0.004 -0.049 -5.094 -0.528
Simple utility function
3. Complete markets -0.21 -1.85 0.013 0.041 -1.60 0.42
4. Incomplete markets -0.12 -1.78 0.007 -0.016 -1.79 -0.17
Note: Short run and long run e¤ects are calculated when the economy switches from of a stationary equilibrium
economy for 1 = 0:64% to an economy hits by a high value of monetary shock 2 = 1:17%. We calculate the changes
in the aggregate X in the short run as X1 X0
X0
and in the long run X1 X0
X0
, where X0 is the stationary equilibrium
value when  = 1, X1 is the new value just after the shock, and X1 is the long run stationary equilibrium value
when  = 2.
4.4 Unconditional correlation
We conclude our discussion on the impact of monetary shocks under incomplete markets by look-
ing at the implied correlation between aggregates (see Table 10.) First, the ination-consumption
correlation is negative in all cases, and more that a third smaller in absolute value when we switch
from the complete-market, simple utility case (CMSU) to the incomplete-market, elaborate util-
ity case (IMEU), a change that comes both from the utility function and the incompleteness of
asset markets. The ination-investment correlation is positive in all cases except for the IMEU
economy, a switch that comes mostly from the incompleteness of asset markets (rather than the
utility function). The correlation between ination and the consumption growth is negative for all
economies and divided by almost 1.5 when moving from the CMSU to the IMEU, with this change
in magnitude mostly coming from the incompleteness of asset markets. The standard deviation
of aggregate variables is roughly the same for ination, real money balances and investment. The
standard deviation of consumption and capital are divided by more than three between CMSU and
IMEU, an e¤ect that comes both from the utility function and the structure of nancial markets.
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Table 10: Correlations
Economy
Simple utility Elaborate utility
Complete-market
economy
Incomplete-market
economy
Complete-market
economy
Incomplete-market
economy
Correlations
Ination-Consumption -0.64 -0.64 -0.56 -0.20
Ination-Investment 0.63 0.63 0.59 0.17
Ination-C -0.90 -0.82 -0.92 -0.63
Standard deviation
Ination 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.007
Money 0.022 0.021 0.022 0.032
Consumption 0.002 4e 4 0.001 6e 4
Investment 0.041 0.004 0.023 0.013
Note: The model properties are averages over a 10,000 period simulation. Ination-C stands for the correlation of
ination at date t and percentage change in consumption (Ct   Ct 1)=Ct 1.
5 Conclusion
This paper has explored the implications of uninsurable labor income risk for the redistributive
and aggregate e¤ects of monetary shocks. Our benchmark economy features incomplete markets,
borrowing constraints, as well as a form of the money-in-the-utility specication that is designed to
reproduce the empirical cross-sectional distribution of money holdings observed in US data. Our
analysis suggests that money growth shocks have a moderate e¤ect on aggregates in this framework
(relative to the complete-market case), but also that changes in aggregates in fact mask a great
deal of wealth redistribution and heterogeneity in portfolio adjustments at the individual level.
In the current model, nonmonetary assets (i.e., claims to the capital stock) are ination-indexed
by construction, so the only asset whose value is directly a¤ected by the ination tax is at money.
While this is a natural benchmark to start with, it clearly underestimates the redistributive e¤ects
of ination shocks, since many nonmonetary assets (e.g., corporate bonds) are not indexed. This
implies that the ination tax that is responsible for the redistributive e¤ects of monetary shocks
under heterogenous cash holdings may in fact be much larger than when considering as nominal
assets only a narrow monetary aggregate (such as M2.)
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A Numerical Algorithm
A.1 Overview of the Algorithm
The algorithm used to obtain the solution of the model is as follows.
1. Given laws of motion for real money balance and capital, dened by (14) and (15), solve the
households problem given by the equations (13), (6), (7) and kt+1 > 0.
2. Simulate the economy to approximate the equilibrium laws of motion for K and M . We use
the grid-based simulation procedure proposed by Young (2008).
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(a) Set an initial wealth/employment-e¢ ciency distribution 0 (a; e) that provides p
i;e
0 the
mass of agents of employment-e¢ ciency type e with wealth ai at the ith wealth grid
point for i = 1;    ; Ngrid; an initial value for ; and initial individual policy rules for k
and m.7
(b) Find the ination rate t that achieves money market clearing and the associated
wealth/employment-e¢ ciency distribution  (at; et; t ). In particular, we iterate on t
until the following condition is satised:Z Z
gm(at; et; t;Mt 1;Kt;t)d (at; et; t) =
(1 + t)
t 1
t
(16)
where gm(at; et; t;Mt 1;Kt;t) is the policy function for real balance that depends
explicitly on the value of t that solves the following households problem:
~v (at; et; t;Mt 1;Kt;t) = max
mt;ct;kt+1
u (ct;mt)+Et

v
 
at+1; et+1; t+1;Mt;Kt+1
 jst; t ;
(17)
where the value function v is the solution of the individual problem dened in step (1).
An interesting point in this problem is that the current distribution  depends on the
current ination rate t. Thereby, we have a di¤erent distribution of wealth for each
t. The steps to nd the equilibrium t are detailed below.
(c) Given the decision rules gk(at; et; t;Mt 1;Kt;t ), and gm(at; et; t;Mt 1;Kt;t ), and
 (at; et; 

t ), calculateZ Z
gm(at; et; t;Mt 1;Kt;

t )d (at; et; 

t ) =Mt
and Z Z
gk(at; et; t;Mt 1;Kt;

t )d (at; et; 

t ) = Kt+1
d. Repeat steps (b) and (c) and obtain a long time series for K and M , of which the rst
part is discarded.
3. Use the time series obtained in step (2) to get the new equilibrium laws of motion for K and
M:
7We use the wealth distribution and the associated policy rules that we get for the economy without monetary
shock.
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4. Compare the new equilibrium laws of motion for K and M with those used in step (1). If
they are similar, stop. Otherwise, update the coe¢ cients of the laws of motion, and go to
step (1).
A.2 Details on the Resolution of the Individual Problem
We have the following rst order conditions
uc (ct;mt)  um (ct;mt) = Et
"
va
 
at+1; et+1; t+1;Mt;Kt+1

1 + t+1
#
(18)
uc (ct;mt) = Et

(1 + rt+1) va
 
at+1; et+1; t+1;Mt;Kt+1

(19)
The last equation is true if kt+1 > 0. Given an initial guess for v0a(:), the rst derivative with
respect to a of the value function, for each grid point, we will solve the individual problem dened
by the previous FOC and the budget constraint (6). Given the solution at each grid point, we get
a new v1a(:) = uc (ct;mt). If the new derivative of the value function is close to the old one, we have
found an approximation of the xed point, and we get g0c (:), g
0
k(:), and g
0
m(:) as the solution of the
problem. If not, we update v0a(:) = v
1
a(:):
We have two distinct cases:
1) If kt+1 = 0, we solve the non linear equation in mt:
uc (ct;mt)  um (ct;mt)  Et
"
v0a
 
at+1; et+1; t+1;Mt;Kt+1

1 + t+1
#
= 0
where ct = at +wtet + t
Mt 1
t
 mt, and given v0a
 
at+1; et+1; t+1;Mt;Kt+1

where at+1 = mt1+t+1 .
Mt; and Kt+1 are given by the xed aggregate laws of motion.
2) If kt+1 > 0, we nd the solution for gc; gm; gk; and va using nested bisection methods. First,
we solve for m and k given a certain level of consumption using equation (18) and the budget
constraint. Second, we solve the capital foc for c where the m and k are given by the previous step.
More formally, for each grid points, we have the following steps:
1. For a given value of c, solve the following foc for m
uc (ct;mt)  um (ct;mt)  Et
"
v0a
 
at+1; et+1; t+1;Mt;Kt+1

1 + t+1
#
= 0
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given v0a
 
at+1; et+1; t+1;Mt;Kt+1

where at+1 = (1 + rt+1) kt+1 + mt1+t+1 , and kt+1 deduced
from the budget constraint. Mt; and Kt+1 are given by the xed aggregate laws of motion.
2. Given kt+1, and mt found in the previous step, solve the following non-linear equation for c
uc (ct;mt)  Et

(1 + rt+1) v
0
a
 
at+1; et+1; t+1;Mt;Kt+1

= 0
given v0a
 
at+1; et+1; t+1;Mt;Kt+1

where at+1 = (1 + rt+1) kt+1+ mt1+t+1 , and Mt; and Kt+1
are given by the xed aggregate laws of motion.
A.3 Details to nd t
The following iterative sub-algorithm is implemented to nd t :
1. Given an arbitrary value of t, solve problem (17), where the value function v is the solu-
tion of the individual problem dened in step (1). This problem generates decision rules
gk(at; et; t;Mt 1;Kt;t ), and gm(at; et; t;Mt 1;Kt;t ) which depend explicitly on the
value of t.
2. For the same arbitrary value of t used in the previous step, and given Kt, Mt 1, t 1 and
the wealth distribution 
 
at 1; et 1; t 1

that we got from the previous simulation period,
calculate the resulting current and updated wealth/employment-e¢ ciency distribution by
using the decision rules that we get in period t 1. Specically for a given t, for each wealth
grid point ai and each employment-e¢ ciency type, calculate the new nancial wealth such as
ga(ai; e; t;Mt 1;Kt;t) = gk(ai; et 1; t 1;Mt 2;Kt 1;

t 1)Rt +
gm(ai; et 1; t 1;Mt 2;Kt 1;

t 1)
 1
t
and nd the index I within the grid such that ga(ai; e; t;Mt 1;Kt;t) lies in [!I ; !I+1].
Then, redistribute the current mass to the grid points !I and !I+1 taking into account the
employment-e¢ ciency ows. In particular, if pi;et stands for the mass of agents of type e at
the ith grid points at period t, let
pI;et = p
I;e
t + ge 1e
!I+1   ga(ai; e; t;Mt 1;Kt;t)
!I+1   !I p
i;e
t 1
and let
pI+1;et = p
I+1;e
t + ge 1e
ga(ai; e; t;Mt 1;Kt;t)  !I
!I+1   !I p
i;e
t 1
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where ge 1e stands for the mass of agents with employment status e that had employment
status e 1 last period.
3. Check if equation (16) is veried. If not, repeat steps (1) and (2) until money market clears.
B Results on Aggregate law of Motions
B.1 IID shocks
We nd the following laws of evolution for current aggregate money Mt and next-period capital
Kt+1. Whatever the values of the growth rate of money, the coe¢ cients associated with Mt 1 and
Kt are statistically signicant at the 1 percent level.
Simple utility function
i)  = 1
lnM 0 =  0:0452 + 0:0794 lnK + 0:8173 lnM; R2 = 0:9997 (20)
lnK 0 = 0:0342 + 1:0090 lnK   0:0643 lnM; R2 = 0:9999: (21)
ii)  = 2,
lnM 0 =  0:0558 + 0:0900 lnK + 0:7981 lnM; R2 = 0:9999 (22)
lnK 0 = 0:0341 + 1:0091 lnK   0:0645 lnM; R2 = 0:9999: (23)
Elaborate utility function
i)  = 1
lnM 0 =  5:7112 + 2:6949 lnK + 0:5667 lnM; R2 = 0:9997 (24)
lnK 0 =  1:7936 + 1:8468 lnK   0:4934 lnM; R2 = 0:9999: (25)
ii)  = 2,
lnM 0 =  5:7961 + 2:7345 lnK + 0:5886 lnM; R2 = 0:9999 (26)
lnK 0 =  1:7175 + 1:8114 lnK   0:4742 lnM; R2 = 0:9999: (27)
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B.2 Persistent shocks
We nd the following laws of evolution for next-period aggregate money M 0 and capital K 0. In
all states of the world the real quantity of money and the aggregate capital stock are statistically
signicant to forecast the dynamics of capital and money.
Simple utility function
i)  = 1
lnM 0 = 0:5762 + 0:1324 lnK   0:0077 lnM; R2 = 0:9936 (28)
lnK 0 = 0:0123 + 0:9945 lnK + 0:0025 lnM; R2 = 0:9912: (29)
ii)  = 2,
lnM 0 = 0:0425 + 0:3277 lnK + 0:0076 lnM; R2 = 0:9921 (30)
lnK 0 = 0:0558 + 0:9780 lnK + 0:0024 lnM; R2 = 0:9919: (31)
Elaborate utility function
i)  = 1
lnM 0 =  4:6057 + 2:0884 lnK + 0:0041 lnM; R2 = 0:9987 (32)
lnK 0 = 0:0101 + 0:9949K + 0:0036 lnM; R2 = 0:9942: (33)
ii)  = 2,
lnM 0 =  4:4188 + 2:0103 lnK + 0:0031 lnM; R2 = 0:9981 (34)
lnK 0 = 0:0401 + 0:9836 lnK + 0:0037 lnM; R2 = 0:9941: (35)
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